I will demonstrate how one firewall administrator & in a non-Management vdom, can actually grab the configuration for all other vdoms. This means the following;
- limited user of non-root-vdom can gather all other vdom cfg even regardless of your profile type
- users of a non-Management vdom can gather ALL other cfgs including root-vdom or the defined management vdom
To expanded on this, if the user is assigned a RO account, he/she can still gather all other configurations details.
1st let's look at my user "custA", he's assigned into custA-vdom & as a firewall administrator. His profile is a RO profile.
So now we will ssh into the firewall or even use https access, all we really need ; " is to get to the cli console to execute our commands cli fnsysctl commands "
A copy of the full saved and running configuration is stored in local directory /data2/config. Yes, it's that obvious, and the unprotected firewall configuration file is present with a time/date stamp to show you the most up todate configuration file.
note: My RO user assigned to vdom-custA can see the config cfg that has permissions set for anybody to read.
So what this means from a muti-tenant use firewall ; " you place your other tenant configurations details out in open , and at risk of being reviewed by another user ( administrator ) who happen to have cli access & via a simple cli command ( fnsysctl ) "
Okay the best way to prevent this type of access;
1: assign the firewall as a FIPS mode ( fnsysctl command accces is eliminated in FIPS-compliant mode of operations )
2: disallow ssh/telnet access for not root-Management vdoms interfaces ( taken away the console access via these management access methods )
3: remove the jsconsole widget-type from non-Management vdom firewall administrators account
( taken away the console access widget )
config sys admin
What I thought was funny, Fortinet took the time effort to protect you from deleting or copying the file to another directory or a usb mount point, but you still have full read-access view of the configuration file on the security appliance by using cat or more with the cli command fnsysctl
If you do try to move or copy the file, you will be challenged with the "Admin" passwords for a valid administrator within the management-vdom
Just keep in mind to control what the "actual firewall administrator has access to " and the cli command fnsysctl, can be quite dangerous. It's a cli tool that can expose everything from ssh/ssk keys and configurations details. The FIPS mode of operations can protect you.
note: I just one to point out, that in a cisco ASA running multi-contexts, this risk is pretty much eliminated. A user can't access the system configurations files without changing to the system context and most important he/she will the priv-level for enable.
NSE ( network security expert) and Route/Switching Engineer
kfelix -----a----t---- socpuppets ---dot---com
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